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In his 2013 presidential scholar address to the American Accounting Association, Michael Jensen, an 
early author of agency theory, makes an appeal for a new language and new paradigm to introduce his 
proposed theory of integrity in accounting. In the 1970s, agency theory was promoted over other theories 
because it demonstrated empirical evidence of the accounting procedures actually used in practice, 
compared to those that “should” be used according to established rules (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Contrarily, in this paper, we show scientific theories (Latour, 1987), and in particular accounting 
theories, are actually accepted by a larger persuasion than just the empirical evidence. The early 
empirical evidence on agency theory was often not even statistically significant. As Jensen now 
demonstrates, consistent with Latour (1987), this persuasion begins with a new language and a new 
world view, and continues with a strategy of properly framing expectations for the data outcomes and the 
empirical evidence.     
 
 
 In his 2013 presidential scholar address to the American Accounting Association, Michael Jensen 
describes how he helped to create the contracting (agency) theory of accounting research. Taking issue 
with Friedman’s (1953) ‘positive economics’ theory of corporate behavior, Jensen claimed that it was in 
fact managers, and not corporations, that generate revenue; and so began the self-interest theory of 
accountancy, referred to as ‘positive accounting theory’ (PAT), and more recently as ‘agency theory’ 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 1986; 1990). This theory argues that because the costs and benefits of 
accounting decisions (e.g., depreciation methods and other accruals) may apply to managers and not 
necessarily to the firm, managers make these decisions not necessarily based on providing the greatest 
accuracy or clarity to the financial statements, but on the benefits to the creators of these statements. For 
example, compensation interests may motivate managers to create the right accounting numbers (the 
bonus hypothesis); creditor interests limit may dividend payments (the debt-equity hypothesis); and costs 
of regulation on income and tax expenses may reduce manager benefits and thereby limit firm behavior 
(the political cost hypothesis) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). By challenging the Statement on Theory 
Acceptance (AAA, 1977), which argues that accountants ought to choose the appropriate procedure to 
improve statement accuracy and clarity, this new positive theory of 1978 argued for an axiomatic intuition 
(everyone is assumed to follow self-interest) that could be observed in "empirical regularities" (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990, p. 152).   
 We will show evidence against these “regularities” and conclude that this theory promotion process 
was more consistent with that used in promoting new scientific theories (Latour, 1987), a form of 
methodology itself (McCloskey, 1983). We show that this larger persuasion is not limited to McCloskey’s 
rhetoric, although agency has been described as the “rhetoric of revolt” (Mouck, 1992). Instead, this 
persuasion established by Latour (1987) requires a basis of agreement, a recognizable paradigm, and a 
common language for describing events, in order to establish, as first suggested by Kuhn (1974), “a 
prelude to proof.”  And in 2013, this is now explicitly mentioned by Jensen, the author of agency theory 
himself (Erhard and Jensen, 2013).  
 This paper begins with the necessity of rhetoric for any theory acceptance: the necessary appeal to the 
rationality of specific constituencies. Rhetorical strategies used by scientists and described by Latour 
(1987) are introduced as part of the internal rhetoric used to enroll followers and to frame, fortify, and 
then to stack the evidence for the promoted theory as ‘generally accepted.’ We then show that early 
agency advocates 'fortify' their descriptions with the familiar language of economics and appeals to 
authorities such as the social citation index used by the agency journal, the Journal of Accounting and 
Economics (JAE), the Nobel Prize, and the results obtained from scientific modeling. This ‘stacking of 
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the evidence’ then establishes the agency point of view that managers act out of self-interest. Next, 
statistical empirical 'irregularities' are framed as approximate 'regularities' for this pre-established point of 
view. Finally, agency advocates do not even bother to consider alternative hypotheses to those available 
under agency theory. From this point of view, since there are no financial economics critics, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) point to a 'non-engagement' of their own critics. This is consistent with the Latour 




 Rhetoric, the language used to persuade, or according to Latour (1987), "the language used to mobilize 
resources" (p. 41), has been elevated from its supplementary or "unnecessary" role (Whittington, 1987, p. 
330) to a form of methodology (see Simons, 1990; Nelson et. al., 1987) necessary for the “conduct of 
[accounting] research" and for the "content and quality of its produce - knowledge" (Arrington and 
Schweiker, 1992, p. 512). Persuasion relies fundamentally on rhetoric (Lavoie, 1987, p. 586). Even 
empirical research begins with a reliance on rhetorical persuasion with statements such as: “In the 
absence of a persuasive theoretical structure on which to build a causal chain, the results cannot be used 
to make inferences about the effect of one variable on another” (Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya, 1979, p. 23). 
 There are many broad classes of rhetorical strategies found in several research areas (see, for example, 
Simons (1990). Each may be divided into two categories: (1) an internal appeal to a specific constituency 
which requires the language of that constituency and many other strategies and devices, or (2) an external 
appeal to as many followers as possible: 
 
“[T]he ... sciences are becoming increasingly rhetorically self-conscious. They are beginning to 
recognize that their discursive practices, both internal and external, contain an unavoidable 
rhetorical component. Internal here refers to those discursive practices that are internal to the 
specific scientific language community; external refers to the discursive practices of that scientific 
(or non-scientific) language communities and the society in general (Gaonkar, D.P., in Simons, 
1990, p. 352). 
 
 Both internal and external rhetoric build a consensus of belief with an intersubjective appeal for a 
common understanding made by the writer. Such an appeal is a result of the writers' ”having actually 
penetrated (or if you prefer, been penetrated by) another form of life, or having, one way or another truly 
"been there". And that, persuading us that this offstage miracle has occurred, is where the writing comes 
in” (Geertz, 1988, p. 4). 
 
Table 1: Rhetoric as Methodology 
 
Subject Reference 
I. The Use of Language to Persuade ((Rhetoric) 
 
1. McCloskey (1983) 
2. Arrington and Schweiker (1992) 
3. Mouck (1992) 
Intersubjective Agreement 
 
  The rhetoric of economics 
  Rhetoric as methodology 
  Rhetorical strategies and devices; the rhetoric of economics, 
of science and of revolt in agency 
II. The Use of Specific Language For 
Constituencies (Latour, 1987) 
 
1. Preston et al. (1992) and Bloomfield et al. 
(1992) 
2. Chua (1992) 
3.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986; 1990) 
Rhetoric to reduce controversy; arguments to(1) fortify, (2) stack, (3) frame, 
and (4) close rhetorical persuasions, given language specific to a discipline. 
 
  The enrolling of physicians and others for the establishment of a national 
health information system 
  Enrolling hospital administrators toward DRG costing 
  Enrolling allies and reducing controversy for agency research in accounting 
 
 Table 1 attempts to illustrate the application of these two rhetorical strategies. The use of language to 
persuade (in part I) makes broad appeals to fairness, justice, and concepts of morality; it appeals to the 
generic everyman. For example, McCloskey (1983) with a broad external appeal claims that the internal 
rhetoric of economics is an "unofficial" methodology. Generally speaking, both internal and external 
rhetoric use those conditions that would otherwise be considered "in context of discovery" (p. 511): 
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upbringing, politics, introspection, theology, history, case study, and devices such as metaphors, 
allegories, parables, and strategies such as simplicity, symmetry, fashion, and appeals to authority. The 
external and internal rhetorical strategies differ only in the subjects of their appeal.     
 For example, presented next in Table 1 is a reference to Arrington and Schweiker (1992) who, through 
a broad appeal, establish that an internal rhetoric is a necessary condition for accounting research. Next in 
Table 1, Mouck (1992) establishes that the appeal of early agency theory is to a specific internal 
economics constituency and that it uses a rhetoric of science and economics described in part by 
McCloskey (1983).  Mouck presents the rhetoric of science agency as having both strategies and devices. 
The strategies include scientific positioning (objective, independent) and devices include appeals to 
authority, expertise, and the evolution of accounting theory. Although Mouck does consider the 
acceptance of agency theory as socio-historical, the rationality given by Mouck for theory acceptance is 
more sociopolitical: 
  
“... to the extent that the story was successful it was due to the fact that it was read by an audience 
attuned to the rhetoric of science, on one hand, and to the Reagan era rhetoric of revolt on the other 
hand, thus allowing the lack of scientific substance to be overlooked...” (Mouck, 1992, p.55)   
 
 Contrary to Mouck (1992), we propose that (1) the rhetoric of agency theory and the rationality for its 
acceptance (Table 1, part 1) is more historic, hence (2) it will have continued social acceptance by its 
constituencies, but most importantly (3) the advocacy of agency theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
1990) is consistent with the rhetorical strategies used by successful scientists as described by Latour 
(1987) and now used by Erhard and Jensen (2013). Through Latour's analysis, this paper attempts to 
answer questions raised by Mouck (1992) and others on the acceptance of accounting research.   
 Latour (1987) presents a model of how scientists and technologists who "discover" facts actually 
enroll others into a particular scientific process of representing what has been observed. Briefly, after 
observing events which are initially described by a weak rhetoric of indecision about what has been 
observed, scientists form opinions, perform laboratory tests, begin to take positions, and then seek to 
defend these positions with evidence that is said to be 'fabricated' and enhanced with rhetoric designed to 
enroll users and reduce controversy. 
 Whether to enroll new users or just to reduce controversy, this rhetoric includes arguments (1) to 
fortify a particular position taken, (2) to stack the evidence incrementally in favor of that position, (3) to 
frame its understanding, and (4) to close arguments against it (see Latour, 1987, pp. 21-57; see 
applications in Preston et al., 1992, pp.574-575, and also Figure 1, later, adopted from p.566).  
 In order to aid in a practical understanding, we provide an example of Latour’s (1987) persuasive 
rhetoric strategy points. This process starts with the fortification of a basis of agreement, established by 
calling upon the familiar. For example, in the development of a hospital information system, it may be 
necessary to enroll users, such as physicians (see Preston et. al., 1992 and Bloomfield et. al., 1992 in 
Table 1, part II). Physicians, not primarily interested in such a computer system, must be persuaded. The 
basis of agreement is patient care: their primary concern. Quality patient care is framed as requiring the 
best possible  diagnostic  information, which can only  be provided by the desired hospital 
information system. 
Further, the system has “ease and efficiency” (as framed) for physicians. This framing can then 
establish the closing argument that, "to ignore such an information system is to ignore patient care." 
Physicians are then "enrolled" and become part of a larger constituency of accountants, managers, 
auditors, and others at the hospital who "need" this system. Similarly, Chua (1992) uses Latour's (1987) 
model to describe the enrolling of hospital administrators to a special costing system.  
 Latour's rhetorical strategies also can be used to defend positions taken with evidence properly framed 
(not falsified but 'fabricated'). One example describes how the DNA molecule was first discovered (1987, 
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p.14). First observed as a possible triple helix, the molecule's final description as a double helix resulted 
after the evidence had been properly examined under the many (fortified and stacked) reasons supporting 
the double helix. 
 
Figure 1: Creation of Facts from Scientific Discoveries 
 (Based on Latour, 1987, p.44; Preston et al., 1992, p.566) 
 
Sequence of Acts Act 
1 Events Observed 
2 Weak Descriptions Recorded 
3 Descriptions Framed By Positions Taken 
4 Positions Fortified, Evidence Stacked 
5 Positions Closed, Objections Isolated 
6 Facts Accepted 
 
 Figure 1 presents a model of Latour's description of how facts are 'fabricated' (Latour, 1987, p.44, 
Figure 1.6; Preston et al., 1992, p.566). From the observance of events comes weak and hesitant possible 
descriptions when scientists begin to form theories, build convincing arguments, modify theory and form 
closing arguments, and finally reduce controversy to a point where 'facts' are created and objectors are 
silenced. Along the way, networks of resolved controversies are formed through operational and 
rhetorical strategies.  
 The focus of this essay is limited to the use of rhetorical strategies described by Latour and is not 
intended to be comprehensive enough to cover all of Latour's concepts, such as his rules of method or his 
principles used to describe scientific discoveries. Nor can we do Latour (1987) justice in the omission of 
all his descriptions of how scientists attempt to increase the number of allies, laboratories, and machines 
to increase the acceptance of their theories. We present a limited form of Latour’s analysis here since 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) use Latour's rhetorical strategies mostly to defend positions taken.   
 We begin with analysis of the first strategy, what Latour calls the process of 'enrolling,' which actually 
is the process of fortifying accepted 'facts,’ found here in the economic language and paradigms of 
financial economics. 
 
Enrolling and Fortifying the Basis of Agreement 
  
 The self-interest economic values, paradigms, and internal language necessary to accept agency theory 
are discussed by many authors, including Tinker et al. (1982) and Mouck (1992). Accounting policy is 
said to serve the firm and management's interests if accounting procedures are chosen to minimize the 
contracting costs to the firm. A bonus plan, for example, is said to direct the self-interests of the manager 
to those of the firm, thereby reducing agency costs to the firm. Since the manager's earnings depend on 




 Watts and Zimmerman (1986), consistent with financial economics of their time (and now challenged 
by behavioral economics), take a cost-benefit approach to theory acceptance, arguing that although the 
predictions of agency may not be perfect, the theory's benefits, such as its "intuitive appeal," far exceed its 
costs of imperfect predictions (p. 12). Following this school of thought, agency advocates had potentially 
many allies, starting with Jensen’s first notable paper entitled ‘The contracting cost theory of the firm’ 




 At that time, there were at least three more reasons beyond those mentioned by Whitley (1988) for the 
continued acceptance of agency. First, having financial economics as a home provided these accounting 
researchers with the status of international acceptance and the attendant image of an academic discipline 
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deny agency theory is to deny the authority of well-grounded and accepted economic theory. Finally, to 
refute agency theory is to refute the very authority of Friedman's Nobel Prize in 1953, the beginning of 
the ‘positive theory of economics.’    
 As suggested by Sterling (1990) with regard to the initial acceptance of Friedman’s theory in the 
1950’s, even if “a majority of economists” do not believe in 'positive economics,' the Nobel Prize still has 
a higher authority than a "majority of economists" (p. 122). Indeed by 1978, the majority of financial 
economists from Jensen’s Journal of Financial Economics favored agency theory. Accordingly, Latour 
(1987) explains that "truths" are only verified when an overwhelming number of authorities claim 
acceptance, in this case, accounting research authorities (p. 61). 
 With particular regard to accounting professors, the Nobel Prize may have a special allure. There are 
few occasions for North American accounting professors to be internationally recognized outside of the 
actions of public accountants, such as those from the AICPA or CICA. Accordingly, such actions may 
bring pride or tarnish upon the image of accounting professors. But the possibility that the Nobel Prize 
may be awarded to an accounting professor elevates the entire academic profession of accounting. 
 Other authorities were recruited. Watts and Zimmerman accrued a certain status when their Journal of 
Accounting and Economics (JAE) was ranked above both the University of Chicago's Journal of 
Accounting Research and the American Accounting Association's The Accounting Review by the citation 
index of outside references (Editorial, 1992, pp.3-6).   
 Another authority, this one taken from science, was the practice of economic modeling, seen as more 
scientific than non-mathematical modeling. The self-interest economics theory is supported the 1992 
Nobel Prize of another University of Chicago Economics Professor, Gary Becker, for his research on the 
economic motivation of social choices (such as those made by women in the workforce). Whitley (1988) 
chronicles this kind of modeling and the rise of mathematical sciences in social research, which began in 
the United States prior to Friedman's 'positive economics' (1953):  
 
This belief in scientific knowledge as a crucial resource in maintaining and improving the social 
order has been particularly strong in the U.S.A. since the Progressive era (Bledstein, 1976, pp. 
123-127, 324-331; Wiebe, 1967, Chapter 6) and received considerable reinforcement from its 
evident military utility in World War II (Kevles, 1977, pp. 367- 392, as given by Whitley, 1988, p. 
641). 
 
 Whitley (1988) adds that many other reasons existed for the acceptance of agency theory in North 
America, including (1) the prestige of the 1959 Carnegie and Ford Foundations which supported scientific 
research in reports found in business education publications, (2) the dominance of universities in their 
contribution to professional training in this area, and (3) the related growth of legal interventions, which 
use the same objective functionalist approach in presenting scientific evidence as used in economics. The 
Latour (1987) analysis would consider of all these aspects as comprising the fortifying process for theory 
acceptance.   
 
Acknowledging Controversy and Creating Acceptable Forms of Evidence  
 
 Consistent with Latour's (1987) rules of rhetoric method, which require investigators to study the 
conditions and processes under which facts are created, we will now investigate the conditions under 
which agency theory was created in 1978, and the subsequent controversy and fabrication of research 
evidence.  An earlier North American controversy in financial reporting that arose from the American 
Accounting Association’s Committee on Concepts and Standards for External Financial Reports led to the 
statement that, "until consensus paradigm acceptance occurs, the utility of accounting theories in aiding 
policy decisions is partial" (AAA, 1977, p.51). Further, because no one theory could satisfy all paradigms, 
"defenders of a particular paradigm are forced to rely on persuasion rather than logic and empirics in 
attempting to defend a proposal" (AAA, 1977, p.48).  
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 In search of paradigms, Professor Robert R. Sterling, a member of this Committee, suggested that 
future theories for accounting come from established theories and paradigms in the behavioral and 
economic sciences (Sterling, 1970). With perfect timing, agency theory was introduced by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), in part using the size hypothesis (a proxy for the political cost hypothesis), an 
economics paradigm solution for accounting procedure choice: the larger the firm, the larger the firm's 
exposure to the political costs of windfall profits taxes, labor strikes, government regulation, and the like; 
therefore, the firm will be more likely to defer earnings to later periods.  
 Ignoring the Committee's appeal for 'persuasion,' the empirical evidence on this size hypothesis was 
presented and argued as probative (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Later, a corresponding theory-driven 
persuasion was given in Watts and Zimmerman (1979), but this exacerbated rather than reduced the 
controversy (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Table 2 presents some of the subsequent works that addresses 
this controversy, most of which are summarized in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) or by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990). These studies directly correlate the size and other agency theory hypotheses with the 
choice of accounting procedures used to defer earnings, and these studies were offered in response to 
design, validity, and statistical questions that arose in the 1978 study. 
 






General price level  
adjustments (GPLA) 
Watts and Zimmerman  
(1978) 
Yes 1. This was the original size hypothesis. No hold 
out sample is used in this or in any “confirming” 
study. 
2. This study and its results were challenged by 
McKee et al. (1984). 
3. Model R2 is 0.20, for in-sample data only 
GPLA McKee et al.  
(1984) 
No 1. Not significant for a holdout sample and Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978). 
2. The Watts and Zimmerman (1978) best model, 
properly stated, was not as successful as the 
naïve alternative. 
3. Model R2 for holdout data is only 0.09. 
Depreciation Hagerman and Zmijewski  
(1979) 
Yes The large firm strategy is not superior to the naive 
strategy (no holdout sample) and is not confirming. 
Oil and Gas Dhaliwal  
(1980) 




Zmijewski and Hagerman  
(1981) 
Yes The poor R2 occurred despite the fact that there was 
no holdout sample and even then, the success rate 
was only 40% (R2 = .09). The result is not superior 
to naive alternative 
Interest capitalization Bowen, Noreen and Lacey  
(1981) 
No The size variable is significant, but only for oil 
industry 
Depreciation Dhaliwal et al.  
(1982) 
No The size variable is significant only at the 0.15 
level. 
Oil and Gas Lilien and Pastena  
(1989) 
No Significance level is 0.06. 
Research and Development Daley and Vigiland  
(1983) 
No Results show that increasing earnings occur for 
smaller firms, but paradoxically, as the firms get 
larger, the importance of size diminishes rather than 
increases. 
Income Tax Zimmerman  
(1983) 
Yes 1. "Size" limited to industry, limited in time. 
2. Smaller, not larger trade firms defer (opposite 
results). 
3. Size is considered a poor proxy for political 
cost. 
Oil and Gas Deakin  
(1979; 1989) 
No Since size is only significant for largest 24 firms, 
considered size not related/poor predictor.                                                                            
* taken in part from Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 258) 
 
 The design and validity questions of Ball and Foster (1982) and later Williams (1989) discredited the 
size hypothesis because of its weak construct validity. Christenson (1983) and Mckee et al. (1984) also 
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invalidated the research of Watts and Zimmerman (1978). Christenson's analysis of Watts and 
Zimmerman made an appeal for better scientific research design (1983). McKee et al. (1984) responded 
with a better research design, first in replicating the in-sample Discussion Memorandum (DM) test of 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), and then in providing additional evidence from another out-of-sample test 
on the 1974 Exposure Draft (ED). McKee et al. (1984) also challenged the methodology, model, and 
'successful' predictions acclaimed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978): 
 
“The theory still fails to classify correctly a disturbingly large number of observations, particularly 
in the ED sample. Moreover, the number of misclassified observations exceeds the expected misses 
from a maximum chance criterion, indicating that a model which predicts that all submissions will 
be unfavorable produces superior classificatory success” (McKee et. al., 1984, p. 650). 
 
 The size hypothesis was not supported. The ignored naive hypotheses and other hypotheses of Ball 
and Foster (1982) still continue to serve as alternative hypotheses for the subsequent appeals by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986; 1990). Finally, it can be seen in Table 2 that only 3 of the 9 studies on the agency 
hypotheses given by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) yield what is generally accepted as a statistically 
significant size hypothesis, even though these studies were given in response to critics, and were later 
acclaimed for their empirical 'regularities.' 
 In order to fortify their position on their theory with at least the appearance of good science, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) seem to agree that the size hypothesis was probably better expressed as the original 
political cost hypothesis. After a discussion of size as a proxy, Watts and Zimmerman conclude that "the 
evidence is consistent with the political cost hypothesis. However the result only appears to hold for the 
largest firms" and "is driven by the oil and gas industry" (1990, p.140). 
  It would appear that Watts and Zimmerman (1986; 1990) do establish some limitations of early 
agency models, and as editors of JAE, they have reported some contrary findings for the size hypothesis 
in their journal. This reporting gives at least an appearance of fairness. Yet, their evidence for the size 
hypothesis still serves as evidence for a pre-established point of view. For example, inconsistent with the 
size hypothesis, Moyer (1990) finds that large commercial banks do not defer earnings. For banks, a 
political incentive to smooth earnings exists by the industry requirement to maintain regulatory capital. 
Although the size hypothesis fails here, indirectly the bonus hypothesis (and agency) is promoted, since 
the board executive salaries are related to regulatory capital and more importantly, the "costs" of 
regulation can be minimized by maintaining regulatory capital (see Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson, 1990), 
and thus agency is again in part sustained. 
 Watts and Zimmerman had to at least appear to be reducing controversy by seeking "alternative 
hypotheses." Unfortunately, this seeking was done only in the contractual, firm-related, agency context 
and world view (1990, p. 145). Non-agency variables were not considered. For example, in a non-JAE 
publication, Cahan (1992) points to a non-agency, non-firm-specific political cost variable and an 
alternative non-political cost hypothesis. But to seek non-agency variables is in part to deny 'positive 
economics,' to deny the Nobel Prize, and to deny generally accepted "truths."   
 This type of behavior, seeking only allies and qualifying other evidence, is consistent with Latour's 
(1987) description of successful scientists and their references. To deny that alternative hypotheses exist 
outside of the agency world view is to appeal to internal rhetoric, and to frame and close the controversy, 
perhaps unfairly. Latour (1987) adds guidance to critics who ask why Watts and Zimmerman seem to 
limit conversation.  
 
Use of Latour's Rhetoric to Reduce Controversy 
 
 Watts and Zimmerman (1986; 1990) respond to the statistical controversy of their critics with the 
rhetorical fortifying, stacking, framing, and closing strategies described earlier. "When controversies flare 
up, the literature becomes technical" (Latour, 1987, p.30). Fortifying arguments require (1) "bringing 
friends in," (2) "referring to former texts," and (3) "being referred to by later texts." All nine of the 
supporting references for Watts and Zimmerman (1978) given in Table 2 and taken from Watts and 
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Zimmerman (1986) can be identified as "friends" of the 'Rochester School' (see Christenson, 1983). All 
but two references are from their own Journal of Accounting and Economics. In Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990), there are references to Wong (1988), Sutton (1988), Jones (1990), Moyer (1990), and Christie 
(1990), all of whom eventually were published in this journal. This assures that Watts and Zimmerman 
will be "referred to by later texts” (Latour, 1987).   
 Also, fortifying requires going "from numbers of allies and resources to still greater numbers" that go 
beyond the need for the prestige of authorities such as the Nobel Prize (Latour, 1987, p.49). For Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), 'beyond authority,' means that agency theory has reached an "intuitive appeal" (p.12).  
This is a typical fortifying statement for establishing a generally accepted, beyond-authority 'fact.' More 
fortifying reasons are also given as part of the framing of tests, presented later.   
     Next, the stacking of the evidence is to be done incrementally: 
    
“First rule: never stack two layers exactly one on top of the other; ...Second rule: never go straight 
from the first to the last layer ...Third rule (and most important): prove as much as you can with as 
little as you can, considering the circumstances” (Latour, 1987, p.51). 
 
 An illustration of these rules can be found in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) where they stack the need 
for theory, chapter by chapter, beyond what could logically be expected from any text. Following 
the ’second rule,’ the need for a positive theory different from any general economics theory is not 
presented in the first chapter, as we are to assume all economics theories are positive. After establishing a 
role for theories, the text simply introduces arguments for any economics-based accounting theory. The 
fact that this text is an advocate of only one of two agency theories, the one defined for firm-related, 
economics-based accounting theory, is not disclosed. The beginning of the text, to the uninformed reader, 
could simply be about the efficient market hypothesis and its relationship to accounting research. 
 Next, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) follow Latour's 'third rule.' By establishing as much as they can 
with as little as necessary, they 'evolve' the information and transactional costs of the "costless" efficient 
market hypothesis to a knowledge state that requires a theory for such costs in the next chapters. These 
chapters then form a chronological history of the University of Chicago economics-based financial 
accounting research. Each of the Chapters 3-6 summarize the related research questions and then pose 
some of the Chicago answers available at some point in time. By posing both the questions and answers 
suggested by traditional neoclassical economic analysis, Watts and Zimmerman do not conclude with a 
need for an agency theory until Chapter 8, where the 'last layer' of the stacking process is found. After 
certain market inefficiencies are questioned, "the contracting role of accounting and its relation to the role 
assumed in Chapters 3-6" is finally investigated (p. 180). No mention is made of the "other" 
economics-based agency theory of the Chicago school, or other economics-based solutions to these 
inefficiencies. No mention of the forthcoming contracting role is given earlier in the outlines provided in 
Chapters 1 and 2. This layer was saved for last. Other examples of stacking may be provided, but Watts 
and Zimmerman make more obvious the use of other devices. 
 First, since their position is one of advocacy, Watts and Zimmerman respond to contrary evidence by 
framing the size hypothesis as one evolved from its "early progress" (1986, p. 265). Hence, it can be 
framed that the size hypothesis was just a "demonstration," and that the correct test of agency theory was 
not performed. They continue to refer to the problems of their research as those problems of measurement, 
and those problems of correct modeling the-yet-to-be-recognized alternative, firm-related (agency) 
variables (1990). 
 If an alternative frame exists, it is not given by Watts and Zimmerman (1990). It is interesting to 
compare their comments on the "early progress" of agency theory with those of Lev (1989) on the early 
progress of a related but non-agency area, the financial accounting, market-based research on the 
relationship of earnings to price changes. With success similar to agency theory research (low power, low 
R2 models), Lev proclaims that success had not been achieved in understanding the underlying earnings 
process.  He instead requests new models and a new approach. In comparison, Watts and Zimmerman do 
none of this.  Alternatively, they continue to frame 'a pre-established point of view.' 
62
Sennetti and Litt                                                                              Advances in Business Research 
2013, Vol. 4, No. 1, 54-67 
61 
Second, the framing strategy is to admit no complete failures. Although "poor models" of agency 
theory are admitted (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 1990), they are presented as providing new challenges 
to researchers, as the size hypothesis did in 1978, to find better firm-related agency theory variables.  
Limited success is automatically assumed because of the continued "empirical regularities" found (p. 
152).  
Finally, the framing of the correct language and tests for agency theory also requires more fortifying, 
which Latour calls "overwhelming" arguments. For example, in continuing their defense of the size 
hypothesis, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) refer to Christie (1990) who aggregates tests where statistical 
significance for the size hypothesis has been found (ignoring low R2 levels and the non-statistically 
significant studies). By aggregating the results of these tests, Christie creates the overwhelming Bayesian 
posterior probability statement of 0.99 that size and other agency theory variables have explanatory power.  
Just as any Bayesian analysis requires a subjective prior distribution, this particular analysis is more 
subjective persuasion than recognized evidence. Despite McKee et al. (1984) and much more evidence, 
the size hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) continues to be 'confirmed' and framed by Christie 
(1990), and now, because of the related controversy, it is framed as a pioneering effort (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). 
To summarize these framing considerations, Watts and Zimmerman (1986; 1990) would have 
followers (a) consider statistical questions to be just imperfect modeling and measurement questions and 
not ones of validity (1990); (b) consider such irregular results to be somewhat regular given the statistical 
significance of the R2 and the absence of other established, non-agency theory alternative explanations 
(1990); (c) consider the "usefulness" of the prediction in terms of the users' welfare (which may be 
depend less on statistical success) (1986, p.14); and (d) consider that since size and other alternative 
agency theory-related variables may be proxies for political costs, agency costs, and other "contracting" 
costs, better ones soon will be found, and these new findings will yield research benefits to those who 
find them (1986, p.358-62; 1990, p.151-3).   
 
Closing and Summary Persuasion for Reducing Controversy  
 
The framing of agency theory research is just part of the rhetorical persuasion needed. The reader may 
still disagree or have doubts, and “may still reach different conclusions” (Latour, 1987, p.56). The 
solution is to lay out the text so that the reader has only one way to go.  One does not truly engage the 
critics directly (Latour, 1987).   
 
“The nature of the game is exactly like that of building a dam. It would be foolish for a dam 
engineer to suppose that water will always obey his wishes…any engineer should start with the 
principle that if water can leak away it will. Similarly with readers, if you leave the smallest outlet 
open to them they will rush out...If the digging and damming is well set up, the reader, although 
taken in, will feel entirely free” (Latour, 1987, p.57). 
 
All objectors' moves are to be controlled through closing (damming) arguments. Doubters are to be 
made to feel alone and "without support and ally, alone in [his/her] profession, or, even worse, isolated 
from the [research] community or maybe, still more awful, sent to an asylum!" (Latour, 1987, p.59). 
For Watts and Zimmerman, this persuasion also includes closing arguments for (a) the paradigm, (b) 
the forms of logic, (c) the evidence, and (d) the plausible demonstrations of success. For (a) the paradigm, 
they state that their paradigm is accepted, one that "has been successful in accounting", and if "the alleged 
errors [were] important...the referees would adopt the suggestions" (1990, pp. 149-150). That is, Watts 
and Zimmerman would have us believe that the objections are not important, not mainstream. Since the 
objections are not important, they seem to rightfully have no responsibility for other (objector) paradigms. 
For (b) the forms of logic, to those who "place unreasonable demands" on their methodology (such as 
Hines, 1988), Watts and Zimmerman defend the right of new ideas to evolve through "the evolutionary 
nature of accounting research" (1986, p. 362; 1990, p.149). That is, they would have us believe that 
objectors are unreasonable and have not 'evolved'. For (c) the evidence, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) 
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argue that their forms of evidence have been accepted and that "criticisms [of agency theory] have failed 
the market test" [i.e., the objectors have failed] (p. 149), even though "the fundamental questions of the 
relation between the observed empirical regularities and this theory remain unexamined" (Leftwich, 1990, 




We find Latour’s (1987) rhetorical strategies to create a persuasion in the research and widespread 
acceptance of agency theory (Watts and Zimmermans, 1978; 1986; 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Our findings add to the current growing body of literature now reinforced by Erhard and Jensen (2013) 
that recognizes rhetoric as methodology necessary for theory acceptance and ‘proof.’ The limited 
short-term interest component of agency theory is now rejected by Erhard and Jensen (2013) in a new 
attempt at a persuasion. The extent of this new persuasion, i.e., framing, fortifying, stacking, and closing 
of arguments, is now just beginning, but as before; it must first be reinforced by a rising world view. We 
see this new world view in the increasingly popular acceptance of behavioral economics over financial 
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